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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

ALTA INDUSTRIES LTD., a Utah
limited partnership, d/ba
Steelco, and ALTA INDUSTRIESUTAH, INC., a Utah
corporation, in its capacity
as general partner of Alta
Industries Ltd.,

REPLY BRIEF OF
DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS
AND
REPLY TO CROSS-APPEAL

Plaintiffs/Appellees,
-vLYNN P. HURST and WASATCH
STEEL, INC., a Utah
corporation,

Supreme Court No. 900612
Priority No. 16

Defendants/Appellants.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The facts are
properly marshalled.
Notwithstanding

Steelco's assertion

that defendants have

failed to "marshal the evidence," defendants did painstakingly
endeavor to do just that by the very extensive statement of facts.
The statement of facts was intended as a marshalling of the
evidence, and effort was made to refer to all significant evidence
bearing on material points of dispute.
little disputed fact was addressed.
statement

of

facts

is

born

of

comprehensive and fair statement.
facts.

Admittedly, not every

The unusual length of the
this

effort

to

present

a

We have here a massive set of

The district court did not make precise findings, and we

deal here with broad findings of fraud and conspiracy. The factual
statement in defendants1 brief is a proper effort at marshalling.

The record is
faithfully cited.
Contrary to Steelco's assertion of defendants' "failure to
cite the record," every effort was made to provide record citation
to every material point in the statement of facts.

The record

citations are not always repeated in the argument portion of the
brief, but the statement of facts provides a record reference on
every material fact. Further, contentious accusations such as that
the brief contains "inaccurate statements of what the record shows"
(page 5) , "misleading and inaccurate recitation of facts" (page
62),

"distort[s]

and

misrepresent[s]

the

record"

(page 63),

"inaccurately stating the evidence" (page 74) , and "misleading this
court" (page 53) amount to a personal attack on the integrity of
defendants' counsel, have no place in an appellate brief, and are
of no assistance in resolving litigated issues. An earnest effort
was made to cite the record accurately.

It is a matter of concern

that plaintiffs' counsel views it otherwise, but it is submitted
that the integrity of the citations will be confirmed by this reply
brief and by the Court's review of the record references.
The Court should disregard
plaintiffs' statement of facts.
Steelco's "Statement of Facts" is not a statement of facts but
an argument.

The instances of pejorative, exaggeration, and

2

argument1 in this "statement of facts" are so numerous that to list
them all would unduly prolong this brief.
If there were a process at this level of court proceeding to
strike this so-called statement of facts, that should be done. A
statement of facts should be couched in non-argumentative language
and should not include pejorative or advocatory statements.

If

Steelco wants to make these statements part of the argument section
of its brief, that is acceptable, but this should not be tolerated
in a

"statement

of

facts."

The

acerbic

tone

of

Steelco^

"statement of facts" is itself persuasive as to where the truth
lies. Those who shout and scream usually have little of substance
to shout and scream about.

1

Examples of improper argument and exaggeration as part of a
purported statement of facts are shown by a reading of pages 10 to
15, which shows that almost every sentence is couched in
argumentative language and uses argumentative words and phrases not
found any place in the record: "process was suspicious" (page 10,
line 13), "inexplicably paid Heaton" (page 10, line 17), "knew or
should have known" (page 10, line 20), "any rational person" (page
10, line 21 and page 11, line 4), and "no plausible reason" (page
11, line 11). (Also see the first three paragraphs on page 12.)
Further examples of exaggeration and argument are Steelcofs
references to the quantity of steel Heaton took in the pickup
trucks as "vast" or "huge" amounts, the ballast steel Wasatch sold
to Steelco as "junk," the cuttings of steel Wasatch bought from
Heaton as "remnant," the commissions Heaton requested as
"kickbacks," the delivery process as "suspicious," the price paid
for the steel as "bargain" and "fraudulently inflated," and
Steelcofs generalization that Hurst and Heaton "always met behind
closed doors, which never happened with anyone other than Hurst."
These exaggerations are not supported by the record. Facts not
properly cited to, or supported by, the record are not to be
considered. Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co.. 588 P.2d 142,
144 (Utah 1978) .

3

REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS
I
The Claims Are Barred
It remains that plaintiffs1 claims are barred by the statute
of limitations and by the prior settlement agreement between
plaintiffs and Heaton. Plaintiffs have presented nothing to avoid
the impact of these threshold legal issues.
A.
In the

face

Statutes of Limitation Bar
Plaintiffs' Claims.
of

the

three-year

statute

of

limitations,

plaintiffs were permitted to present evidence on and collect
damages for alleged wrongdoing clear back to 1983 even though this
case was not filed until April of 1989. Thus, the threshold issue
on this appeal is plaintiffs1 effort to avoid the limitation
period.
The limitation issue
was properly raised.
Steelco seems to argue that separate limitation arguments must
be made with respect to each theory of its case.

This is not

necessary, because the limitation period (three years) is the same
on each of the theories on which the court based its findings.
But, even so, defendants1 amended answer included as a fourth
affirmative defense:

"The action of Plaintiff is barred by the

provisions of UCA § 78-12-25 and § 78-12-26." Section 26(2) is the
limitation

on

actions

for

conversion;

section

26(3)

is the

limitation on actions for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud.
Plaintiffs,

in

the

findings prepared

by

them, made

no

distinction between the limitations applicable to their separate
4

claims.

Throughout the case, arguments addressed to limitations

issues went to all three theories of recovery because a three-year
period applied to all. The court made no distinction.

That these

issues were presented to the trial court is shown by the court1s
Findings 46-48, which deal generally with limitations to all of the
claims.

(R. 350-352.)

conversion,

fraud

and

The court does not distinguish among
conspiracy

claims

in making

findings.

Similarly, defendants' objections were addressed to all of these
claims, and no distinction is necessary.

(R. 305-308.)

The discovery rule does
not save plaintiffs1 case.
The gist of plaintiffs1 argument is that they are saved by the
discovery rule.
brief notes that

That rule cannot be applied here.

The opening

(p. 38) Utah's statute does not extend the

discovery rule to conversion actions; but beyond that, there is no
basis for utilizing the rule on any of the claims in this case.
As in so many other places, plaintiffs rely upon the findings
without addressing the point that those findings are not supported
by facts in the record.
challenged,

and

the

It is those very findings that are here

simple

act

of

the

court's

signing

of

plaintiffs' proposed findings does not create something out of
nothing. Plaintiffs complain that facts have not been marshalled.
But one cannot marshall facts that do not exist, and there are no
facts here justifying application of the discovery rule. There is
no

evidence

concealment

showing

that

or establishing

defendants

committed

any

act

of

that defendants had any duty of

disclosure.
5

Steelco concedes that the discovery rule would not apply
unless

there

was

evidence

"fraudulent concealment."
this case exceptional.

of

"exceptional

circumstances" or

However, there are no facts which make

Plaintiffs' argument is nothing more than

an assertion that every fraud and conspiracy claim is exceptional.
They

would

have

the

Court

say

that

the

discovery

rule

is

automatically applied in a fraud and conspiracy case and the
limitation period cannot begin to run until a plaintiff gets around
to

doing

wrongdoing.

something

that

finally

alerts

it

to

the

claimed

This would read the statute of limitations out of the

law pertaining to fraud and conspiracy.

That is not the law, and

it ought not to be the law where claims of fraudulent conduct are
asserted.
To toll the limitation period, there must be an "affirmative
act . . . calculated to obscure the existence of a cause of
action." Pavne v. Stratman, 229 Mont. 377, 380, 747 P.2d 210, 213
(1988).
that

Utah "cases dealing with fraudulent concealment indicate

neither

material

omissions

nor

fraudulent

affirmative

statements are actionable absent a duty to speak the truth."
Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah
1989).

Plaintiffs have not shown one single "affirmative act" by

defendants or one single "fraudulent affirmative statement."
Steelco overlooks an important distinction between the finding
of fraud related to payment of some commissions (or "kickbacks" as
plaintiffs

characterize

them)

and

the' finding

of

fraudulent

concealment necessary to toll the statute of limitations.
6

Where

there is no fiduciary relationship creating a duty of disclosure,
a claim may be time-barred even if a defendant had knowledge but
did

not

affirmatively

disclose.

Hurst

had

no

fiduciary

relationship that required him to disclose to Steelco that its
superintendent, Heaton, asked for a commission on a small number of
sales.
Defendants did nothing to conceal a claim from Steelco.

The

allegation that Mr. Hurst refused to talk to Elkington, Steelco1s
chief executive, is without support in the record.2

Mr. Hurst

cooperated with Elkington1s request but, on the advice of counsel,
asked for authorization from Heaton before producing records of
transactions with him.

(R. 454 at 91, 94.)

As an experienced

accountant, Elkington took notes from the records for the years
1985, 1986 and 1987, but he never returned to review records from
earlier years which were more difficult to locate.

(R. 454 at 94-

98.) The fact that, after his visit late in the day on New Year's
2

Steelco also maintains that when Elkington called Hurst,
Hurst "confirmed the phony $9,185.85 number" given to Steelco by
Hurst as the value of the steel he had sold to Wasatch.
(Plaintiffs1 brief at 22.) Elkington!s testimony does not go that
far:
Q.

What did the two of you say?

A.

I [Elkington] told him [Hurst] I hadnft heard back
from him yet but I had received a letter from Volma
Heaton which indicated that the total loss related
to his involvement with Wasatch Steel was $9,100,
approximately. And asked him if that was accurate
and he said he thought it was.

(R. 452 at 131-132, emphasis added.)
But that was only a
preliminary telephone inquiry, not based on any examination of the
records.
7

Eve (R. 454 at 94), Elkington never returned to review records for
1983 and 1984 does not show concealment.
Recognizing
concealment

by

that

there

defendants,

is

no

Steelco

evidence
tries

to

of

any

hold

act

of

defendants

responsible for Heatonfs acts of concealment. In the pages (46-47)
where plaintiffs try to show that the courtfs findings with respect
to the discovery rule "are amply supported by the record/' Heaton's
name appears 23 times (not counting the personal pronouns referring
to him), Wasatch Steel is mentioned twice, and Mr. Hurst is
mentioned twice (and this only in the context of being on the
receiving end of Heaton's action, not in the context of doing any
affirmative act of concealment). The brief recites that Heaton did
this, and Heaton did that.
Hurst did or said.

It does not show anything that Mr.

This effort to convert their superintendent's

acts of concealment into acts of defendants is contrary to this
Court's express direction that the "concealment of necessary facts
or misleading" must be done by the party asserting the limitations
defense.

Becton Dickinson and Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254# 1257

(Utah 1983) (in the case of a counterclaim, required an act of
concealment "by the plaintiff"—emphasis in original).
B.

Steelco Released its Claims
by its Agreement with Heaton

The issue was presented
to the trial court.
Steelco insists that the issue of whether its settlement
agreement with Heaton bars this action was not adequately raised.
Wasatch pleaded as a "Second Affirmative Defense":
8

On March 24, 1988, Heaton and Plaintiff entered into a
written Agreement which settled all matters between them
and particularly those matters allegedly involving the
Defendant Wasatch Steel Inc. A copy of this Agreement is
attache[d] hereto. The Agreement contains no reservation
of rights and therefore constitutes a complete bar to
Plaintiffs' action.
(R. 88, emphasis added.)
Rule 8 requires only a "short and plain" statement of the
claim.

"No technical forms of pleading" are required.

Rule 8(e),

Utah R. Civ. P. "The general rules of pleading that are applicable
to

the

statement

of

affirmative defenses."

a

claim

also

govern

the

statement

of

5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure, § 1274 (1990 & Supp. 1991).

Statutory citations

need not be provided at the pleading stage, id., § 1377; see also,
Jackson v. Jovner. 12 Utah 2d 410, 367 P.2d 452, 454 (1961)
(contents of applicable Wyoming laws did not need to be pleaded).
Steelco also claims this defense was never argued because it
is not discussed in defendants1 memorandum.
counsel did try to present the argument.

(R. 387.)

However,

E.g., R. 451 at 42-62.

When the court questioned the settlement agreements admissibility,
counsel explained, "I think if [the plaintiffs] donft preserve
their rights, that they can't pursue any further action against
third parties."

(R. 451 at 61.)

After the court adopted the findings of fact proposed by
Steelco, defendants objected
effects

of

the

settlement

to Findings 53-55 regarding the
agreement.

(R.

310-311.)

They

emphasized that "the agreement does not reserve any right against

9

anyone" and that it was "was fully performed by both parties"
before the attempted rescission.

(Id.)

The Joint Obligations Act
still applies to this case.
The issues in Krukiewicz, Holmstead, and this case are not
identical.

Steelco

maintains

that

§

15-4-4

of

the

Joint

Obligations Act has no application to these facts since its "pro
tanto" repeal by § 78-27-42 of the Comparative Negligence Act. Of
course, the phrase "pro tanto" as used in Krukiewicz does not mean
"total" or "complete"—it means "as far as it goes."

Black's Law

Dictionary.
In construing statutes, this Court has always been careful to
harmonize two apparently conflicting statutes where possible. Any
repeal by implication is disfavored and is narrowly construed.
By its terms, the Joint Obligations Act applies to joint
obligors, including joint tortfeasors. The Comparative Negligence
Act

and

its

successor,

the

Liability

Reform

Act,

apply

to

negligence claims. Thus, it is not difficult to harmonize the two
statutes:

The Joint Obligations Act states a general rule; the

Comparative Negligence Act states an exception which applies to
negligence claims.3
Steelco argues that release rules enunciated in the Joint
Obligations Act have been "generally abandoned"—by the Restatement
Second or in some other jurisdictions.
3

That would not justify

Because tortfeasors in negligence actions that accrue after
the effective date of the Liability Reform Act can be found only
severally liable, the Joint Obligations Act no longer applies to
them. The two laws again stand separately.
10

abandoning them in this jurisdiction, for the Utah legislature has
never expressly repealed them, and any repeal by implication must
be based on the principles of statutory construction enunciated by
this Court.
The

holding

in

Krukiewicz

Krukiewicz is distinguishable:

is

not

disputed.

However,

(1) it was a negligence action, and

(2) the settlement agreement expressly reserved a right to proceed
against the defendant, the negligent tortfeasors employer.
Steelco quotes a sentence in Krukiewicz out of context to
support its argument that "the Comparative Negligence Act applies
no matter what theory of liability is advanced by the plaintiff."
The context surrounding that sentence shows a different intent.
When plaintiffs sued the negligent tortfeasor's employer, the
employer argued that the Comparative Negligence Act should not
apply because his liability was only "derivative"; it arose "not as
a result of any actual negligence by the employer, but solely
because of the employerfs employment of the employee."

The court

rejected the employers argument, explaining:
Section 78-27-40(3), patterned after the 1939 Uniform
Act, defines a joint tort-feasor in terms of liability,
not negligence: Joint tort-feasor means "one of two or
more persons, jointly or severally liable in tort. . . . "
All jurisdictions which have statutes similar to the 1939
version of the Uniform Act have determined that the
master-servant relationship is within the Uniform Actfs
definition of joint tort-feasor.
At 1352.
Significantly, Steelco does not address Branch v. Western
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 270 (Utah 1982), where this Court

11

refused to apply the Comparative Negligence Act to a strict
liability claim.
If comparative negligence principles do apply, this case must
be remanded for a determination of the relative fault of Heaton,
Williams, plaintiffs, and defendants.
The settlement agreement is
not void for inaccuracies.
Contrary to Steelco's argument that the release was given
"shortly following Steelco's discovery" of Heaton1s conduct (page
26) , the agreement was not made until March 1988, long after
Steelco was advised of Heaton1s conduct in November 1987 and after
Elkington had examined the records at Wasatch in December 1987.
Steelco now raises a host of supposed inaccuracies in the
information given and argues that the agreement was not effective
because of the inaccuracies.

But when we look to what Steelco's

president testified was the basis for this attempted rescission,
there is no basis for this contention. The facts, fully supported
by record references, are given in the opening brief (pp. 33-35).
Contrary to Steelco's assertion that no record citation is given
for, and that the record does not support, the statement that
Elkington was told that the 1983 and 1984 records would be made
available

at

a

more

convenient

time

and

with

Heatonfs

authorization, record reference is given in the statement of facts
at page 24, and the record does fully support that statement.
454 at 97-98.)

(R.

Steelco's effort to avoid knowledge that a

"commission" was paid (as discussed at page 34 of the opening
brief) and its claim that the record showing the commissions "had
12

no indication that it was a kickback11 strains credibility when it
is realized that Elkington is a trained accountant with years of
experience with a "big eight" accounting firm. Steelco's assertion
that these were "kickbacks" rather than "commissions" is just
semantics, not evidence that information was withheld.4

Moreover,

even if every detail of Heaton's conduct were not known when the
agreement was signed, that is not essential, particularly in light
of Elkingtonfs testimony of the basis for the so-called rescission.
Beyond that, the agreement itself recited:
The Company has recently discovered some of such wrongful
and unlawful acts, and now has sufficient knowledge and
evidence to bring a lawsuit or other action against
Heaton for, among other things, restitution of monies
wrongfully received by Heaton.
(Ex. P-22 at 1; emphasis added.)

4

On this important point, it is to be noted that Heaton first
testified at trial that he advised Elkington about the commissions
"before or at the time" he entered into the settlement agreement.
(R. 451 at 123-124). At that point, fortuitously for plaintiffs,
a recess was called. After the recess, Mr. Heaton1s memory is
suddenly not clear: "I am not positive. Some time, I don't know
when it was . . . . I don't recall exactly when . . . . I don't
know when it was or the circumstances
No, I don't think it
was [when Elkington was talking to him in December 1987]. I am not
sure when it was. . . . Whether it was after we had signed the
agreement or whether it was between that Settlement Agreement and
the time of the Rescission, that they mentioned the commissions.
I don't recall when it was. I cannot give you a date on it. . . .
I don't know when it was. I don't. That was three years ago."
(R. 451 at 125-126.) This further underscores the importance of
the statute of limitations in this case. This is another example
(in addition to those given at pag6 43 of the opening brief) of
plaintiffs' witnesses being unable to remember important facts
because of the passage of time.
13

Mere designation as an
"agreement not to sue"
does not alter the effect.
Steelco argues that its release did not effect release of
other parties because it was termed an "agreement not to sue." The
general rule is that "a covenant not to sue one or more tortfeasors
with express reservation of the right to proceed against others
does not bar an action against other joint tortfeasors."

United

States v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 208 F.2d 428 (D. Utah 1958)
(emphasis added; applying Utah Code Ann. § 15-4-1 to 4).
Steelcofs "agreement not to sue" did not expressly reserve the
right to proceed against others.

"[I]n the absence of such a

reservation of rights," the release—however denominated—"shall
discharge co-obligors" as provided in § 15-4-5.

Utah Code Ann. §

15-4-4 (Joint Obligations Act).
The designation as a "release" or a "covenant not to sue" is
immaterial.

To determine the nature of the document

it is

necessary to look to its terms, the words used, the amount paid,
the substance of the agreement, and the intention of the parties.
"In a true covenant not to sue, the amount of damages is uncertain,
the party does not intend to fix the loss by the agreement, and
full satisfaction is not admitted."
222 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah 1950).

Dawson v. Board of Education,

The release at issue here is not a

true covenant not to sue, because rights against others were not
expressly reserved, the amount of damages was calculated, and the
parties did intend to fix the loss and provide full satisfaction.
(See Ex. 22-P).
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The purported "rescission"
was untimely and not
supported bv considerations
Steelco^ elaborate effort to support its argument that the
"rescission" of the release is supported by consideration is of no
help, because the attempted rescission did not occur until four
months after this suit was filed and defendants had raised the
issue.

The attempted rescission could not subsequently avoid the

impact of that release.

The claim had been released before suit

was filed. When a valid release has been executed, any subsequent
rescission

should

be

accomplished

prior

Steelco1s alleged rescission was untimely.

to

bringing

suit.

The "rescission" was

not signed until August 16, 1989—more than four months after the
complaint was filed.

(See chronology in Appendix B to the opening

brief.)
Further, the "rescission" was not really a rescission.

The

money paid by Heaton as part of the settlement was not returned.
Any rescission that would return the parties to the status quo
would have required a refund of the consideration.
The rescission is also invalid because it was not supported by
adequate consideration. The rescission itself must be supported by
consideration.

Steelco argues there was consideration because

Heaton was relieved of various obligations.

The "assignment" was

illusory because there is no evidence that there were any amounts
due to him.

Further, the whole agreement is illusory because

Steelco never intended to enforce any of these matters in any
event.

It had already given assurances to Heaton that it would
15

keep this whole matter out of court (Exhibit 20-P), and no action
has ever been taken against Heaton.
II
The Evidence Is Not Adequate to
Support the Courtfs Findings of Liability
A.

The Inadequacy of the Findings in General

The factual picture
must be seen clearly.
The factual picture here involved covers several years and a
long course of dealing between the parties.

Mr. Heaton had been

selling materials from Steelco's plant during this same time to at
least three other companies in addition to Wasatch Steel.

(Record

references at p. 14 of opening brief.) To understand this picture,
it is necessary to focus accurately on the picture and see it
precisely as it applies to defendants and not in the blurred mess
presented by plaintiffs.

To do that, plaintiffs1

concession

(plaintiffs1 brief at p. 6) that this case involves "two discrete
kinds" of conduct is helpful. These two kinds of conduct were (a)
purchase over a period of years

(1983-1987) of steel sold by

plaintiffs1 superintendent; and (b) payment of commissions with
respect

to

the

ballast

steel

sold

by

Wasatch

when

Steelco

experienced a shortage of this type of rough material in 1986. It
is correct that these were discrete factual circumstances, and they
should be examined as such.
understood

It is further helpful if it is

that the first discrete

factual

circumstance, the

purchase of steel by Wasatch, involved two basically different
situations:

(a) purchase of "cuttings," be they
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"scrap" or

"remnant," and (b) purchase of some larger items from the South
Yard when Steelco directed its superintendent in 1986 to clean up
the South Yard and dispose of the steel that had long been sitting
out there. Thus, there are really three discrete kinds of conduct.
This distinction is necessary because of the different types of
steel involved and the different circumstances in Heatonfs disposal
of it.
The evidence must be
clear and convincing.
In examining the adequacy of the factual record, it must be
remembered that as to the findings of fraud and conspiracy it is
not enough if there is some evidence; there must be clear and
convincing evidence. Plaintiffs' approach in some places in their
brief is to point to the finding on a particular factual conclusion
as evidence that facts to support that conclusion exist.

The

finding is not evidence, but rather it must be supported by
evidence, and the supporting evidence must be clear and convincing.
The findings
are inadequate.
Many of the findings of fact which plaintiffs caused the court
to sign are not really findings of "fact"; they are, rather,
conclusions of fact or legal conclusions. For example, Finding 14,
which is the main finding on the fraud and conspiracy issue,
concludes that "Volma Heaton, on the one hand, and Lynn Hurst and
Wasatch Steel, on the other hand, combined, conspired, and agreed
that Volma Heaton would over time steal materials from Steelco and
deliver them to Wasatch Steel, Inc. and that Wasatch Steel, Inc.
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would pay to Heaton a fraction of the value of that steel. . . . M
Yet nowhere is there any direct finding as to any act, occurrence,
or fact that would establish this legal conclusion.

For example,

there is no finding that Hurst said this or Hurst did that.
Similarly, Finding 13 makes a legal conclusion that defendants
"should have known, and did know, that Heaton was stealing the
steel material from Steelco . . . ." That also is a conclusion and
not a finding of fact. It does not find that an event or series of
events occurred from which this conclusion is reached.

Thus, this

Court cannot readily assess the propriety of these conclusions. If
the court below had determined a fact, for example, that on certain
occasions this was said or that was done or something

else

occurred, defendants would be able to marshal evidence that bore on
that specific finding and this Court would be able to determine if
there were clear and convincing evidence to support the finding
that that event occurred.
B.

But here it cannot do so.

There Is No Clear and Convincing
Evidence of Fraud

Plaintiffs attempt to treat this appeal as an attack on only
four findings. While it is true that the four findings referred to
are without proper evidentiary support, the manifest problem is
that there is no clear and convincing evidence of the alleged fraud
and conspiracy.
Defendants did not
know of Heaton's thefts.
It remains, as discussed in the opening brief, that a key
element to plaintiffs1 case is the assertion that defendants knew
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of Heatonfs fraud on his employer.
fact whatever.

Here, Finding 13 offers us no

It simply concludes that Hurst and Wasatch Steel

should have known or did know.

Even after all of the rhetoric in

plaintiffs' brief, it remains that it is not so established by
clear and convincing evidence. All that plaintiffs have presented
are murky

and muddled

contentions, not clear

and

convincing

evidence.

Plaintiffs do not once cite the record in this portion

of their brief but simply say "the Statement of Facts sets forth
the evidence that defendants had knowledge of the fraud." That may
be acceptable if there were adequate record references in the
statement of facts, but there are not.

Let us look again at the

"evidence" that plaintiffs refer to.
First, plaintiffs state (p. 57) that this included evidence
that Heaton repeatedly reminded Hurst that his deliveries of stolen
steel were to be kept secret.
statement by Heaton.

There is nothing but a general

Candidly, it is conceded that that is some

evidence, but in light of the entire record it is not clear and
convincing evidence.

Heaton1s statement that he told defendants

not to say anything about these purchases came out only at trial.
It was denied by Mr. Hurst.

(R. 454 at 98.)

Even these alleged statements not to say anything were not
made in the course of the sale of the remnant or scrap cuttings but
are supposed to have been made in the course of the sale of
material from the South Yard in 1986 when Heaton was telling Mr.
Hurst which loads were to be paid for to Steelco and which were to
be paid to him.

(R. 451 at 8, 14, 16-19.)
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Thus, even these

claimed statements would not have been made with respect to the
sale of cuttings.

While it is admittedly not clear in which of

these discrete situations those statements are supposed to have
been made, that is the point—the very testimony is not clear and
convincing.
But beyond this, this testimony is contradicted by other
statements of Heaton made in his pretrial deposition and is
inconsistent with other facts in the case. First, it must be noted
that plaintiffs try to slide over Heaton's trial testimony (R. 451
at 75) and his prior deposition testimony that in the beginning he
told Wasatch that he was buying this material from Steelco (quoted
in defendants1 opening brief at p. 49) by simply asserting that the
companion statement in the opening brief that Heaton again affirmed
that the subject was never brought up again "is inaccurate" (p. 57
plaintiffs1 brief).

Heaton's testimony (R. 451 at 78-81) is set

forth verbatim in Appendix A to this brief. The record shows that
the statement in defendants1 opening brief is entirely accurate.
Heaton himself said, "When I first started dealing with him, I told
him I was buying it and reselling it," and Heaton repeated more
than once that the subject was never brought up again.
confirmed this.

(R. 454 at 72.)

Mr. Hurst

This is but one example of the

errors in plaintiffs1 brief.
In addition to this prior contradictory deposition testimony,
plaintiffs have no answer to Heatonfs testimony quoted in the
opening brief (p. 50) that he had "no agreement with Lynn Hurst or
Wasatch Steel to misappropriate material from [his] employer."
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Plaintiffs have no answer for Heaton's testimony that he at first
paid his employer and that when he changed and stopped paying for
the steel he never told anyone about it.

(R. 451 at 96-99.)

Plaintiffs have no answer for the fact that, when Heaton started
the process of buying and selling, his purchases were authorized.
(See record references at p. 10 of opening brief.)
It is also illuminating to review the other evidence which
plaintiffs rely on in an effort to conceal the absence of clear and
convincing evidence that defendants knew that the material being
sold was stolen.

Plaintiffs assert that "Hurst misled Steelco

employees to believe that Hurst was a personal friend" (p. 58, no
record

reference

given).

The record

reference

for this in

plaintiffs1 statement of facts is R. 452 at 26, where Patty Midgley
simply said that Mr. Hurst came into her office sometimes every
week and would ask for Volma Heaton.

"He would just say that he

was Lynn Hurst and so I figured it was a personal friend." Is this
clear and convincing evidence that defendants "misled" anybody? Is
this clear and convincing evidence that defendants knew that the
material was stolen?

Plaintiffs also offer as support for this

finding that defendants "knew" the goods were stolen, that "Hurst
never dealt with anyone at Steelco other than Heaton."
record reference.)

(P. 58, no

In the first place, Mr. Hurst did not know

anyone else at Steelco to deal with (R. 454 at 87), but it may be
asked, simply, what need was there to deal with anyone else when
Steelcofs superintendent was the one who had come to Wasatch and
offered the material for sale?

As further "evidence," plaintiffs
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tout that "virtually all deliveries were after Steelco's hours."
(P. 58, no record reference.)

This is not clear and convincing

evidence that defendants knew the steel was stolen, but it is also
not the fact.

The record

is to the contrary.

Even under

plaintiffs1 version of the facts, deliveries were made before
Wasatchfs closing time at 5:00 p.m., and while Steelco's second
shift was in full progress.
brief.)

(Record references at p. 14 of opening

These are hardly clandestine activities, and this is not

clear and convincing evidence of a fraudulent conspiracy or of
knowledge on the part of defendants.
The assertion is made (p. 59) that when Steelco discovered
Heatonfs thefts and requested the opportunity to look at the
records of Heaton1s sales to Wasatch, defendants did not react like
honest businessmen because Mr. Hurst said he first wished to
contact the company's lawyer. The reason for that is quite simple.
Heaton had been in earlier and for the first time advised that he
was "being investigated."

(R. 454 at 88-89.)

It was Heaton under

investigation, not Wasatch, but Wasatch did not wish to get caught
in the middle of that dispute.

Heaton asked that information not

be given, but he was told Hurst would not be involved in any
attempt to withhold information.
by the

lawyer was

simply

to

(R. 454 at 89.) The advice given
obtain Heatonfs

permission

inspection of records pertaining to the sales by him.

for

It is hoped

that all clients do not become suspect because they seek guidance
from their lawyer.

But beyond this, it must be remembered that

throughout this entire course Wasatch had kept a precise record and
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receipts of every payment to Heaton.

(R. 450 at 42-49, 199.) Does

one keep precise records and receipts if one is trying to commit
fraud in the very transactions recorded?

Those records were

readily made available to Elkington, the only condition being that
Heaton, who was the one under investigation, give authorization.
The authorization was given and the records were immediately made
available. No records whatsoever were withheld, and the statement
that the "only records Elkington saw were those hand picked by
Hurst" is absolutely not true. Plaintiffs give no record reference
for these extreme statements (p. 59). The record references for
the facts on these points are given at pages 21 through 24 of
defendants1 opening brief.
In this same context, plaintiffs argue that Mr. Hurst "picked
out the remnants he wanted from Steelco's remnant racks."
no record reference.)

(P. 58,

Although there is no record reference in

this argument, there are record references for similar statements
in plaintiffs1 statement of "facts" (p. 10). The argument (p. 58)
makes it sound like Mr. Hurst went over and "picked out" all the
cuttings to be purchased.

The statement of "facts" concedes that

Mr. Hurst did this only "sometimes" (p. 10) .
important points to understand here.

There are several

First, plaintiffs rely

totally on Mr. Hurst's testimony for this assertion of fact, and
plaintiffs must accept that testimony on this issue in its totality
and not take just bits and pieces. Mr. Hurst explained to counsel
when questioned on this line:
What I am trying to imply here is that in '87 there were
times when a big major yard cleanup began and I went over
23

and gave a bid on a large quantity of material. Nothing
specific, no sorting, no picking, just here is the area
that needs to be cleaned, you know, and I made a bid at
that time."
(R. 450 at 67.)
In response to the question whether he had

"ever gone into

Steelco's shop and look[ed] at remnant material that you wanted to
purchase there," Hurst responded that he had.

(R. 450 at 67.)

From this one example, plaintiffs make it appear that Mr. Hurst
"picked out" everything he purchased.

They completely ignore his

explanation that his review of the material was basically with
respect to the South Yard cleanup. They also overlook his further
testimony that (with one exception) he was never requested to bid
on material inside the plant and that although he was at the plant
ten or fifteen times, he always looked at the material outside the
plant.

(R. 454 at 98.)

(The one exception was when Heaton

indicated that there was material inside that he had sheared to the
wrong dimensions and he wanted a bid on it.

Mr. Hurst did make a

bid, but he did not get the material because his bid was not good
enough.

(R. 454, p. 99.))

It is curious that plaintiffs argue in

the same breath that these sales were handled in a clandestine
manner and yet in another breath argue that Mr. Hurst was almost
constantly at the plant "picking out" what he wanted.
At this point it is helpful to discuss plaintiffs1 argument
that everything except the material from the South Yard was
"remnant" and not "scrap."

In direct examination, plaintiffs1

counsel repeatedly used the word "remnant," probably on the theory
that if something is repeated often enough people will believe it.
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But Mr. Hurst

specifically

explained

that, to him, "scraps,

remnant, drops, shearings, leftovers" are all the same.
40.)

(R. 450 at

He further testified (R. 454 at 75-76) that over this period

of time the material he bought from Heaton would all fit in the
back of a pickup truck or in the back of Heaton1s trailer and was
all under ten feet in length and less than five or six inches in
width.

That is well within Steelcofs definition of scrap, not

remnant. He further testified that except for the semi-truckloads
of stuff that came in on the big cleanup of the South Yard, all of
the material was scrap, both to him and according to the definition
of scrap given by Steelco^ own witness.
opening

brief

for record references.)

(See pp. 5-7 and 64-65 of
Admittedly,

there is

testimony from Heaton that everything sold was "remnant," but
plaintiffs would have it appear that Heaton1s testimony is without
contradiction.
Next, plaintiffs argue (p. 58) that Wasatch paid both Heaton
and Steelco for the same kind of steel in amounts directed by
Heaton. There is no explanation that this was with respect to the
massive cleanup of the South Yard, and the implication is that this
argument applies as well to the scrap cuttings.

With respect to

the South Yard material, it remains that Heaton was, in fact, given
part of the material for himself to resell (R. 451 at 13) and was
directed to dispose of the rest for Steelco (R. 451 at 16-17) .
There were many truckloads involved in this cleanup.

It was after

about every four or five loads that Heaton, who was plaintiffs1
superintendent directly charged with disposing of this material,
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directed which loads were to be paid to him and which to Steelco.
Thus,

there

is

clearly

a

"rational

explanation"

for

these

arguments, and there is no question that Wasatch was following the
direction of the one given specific authority to handle the task of
selling the material.
Finally on this point, plaintiffs argue in the same breath the
issue of Heaton's authority and the payment of commissions.

The

authority issue as to split payments on the South Yard sales is
disposed of above.

The general question of authority and the

commissions issue are responded to below.
Each of the assertions made by plaintiffs at this point in
their brief has here been carefully examined and has been shown to
be in error.

We do not have the luxury of space to examine every

error throughout the brief, but it is suggested that these errors
and argumentative exaggerations amply demonstrate the weakness in
plaintiffs• position.
No evidence
of conspiracy.
In section 2 of their brief plaintiffs concede that any
evidence of a "conspiracy" is purely circumstantial, apart from the
payment of commissions

(which is discussed below), and there

follows an argument that a conspiratorial agreement "that Wasatch
would accept stolen steel" is to be inferred from a series of
supposed circumstances. The problem is that these suppositions are
not based on record evidence and are certainly not clear and
convincing evidence.

The first argument is that the inference of

agreeing to accept stolen steel arises from "having done so for
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years."

This is like a dog chasing its tail; but more basically,

it necessarily presupposes knowledge of the theft

(and this

"knowledge" is also raised as the basis for the "inference"). But
the lack of evidence for this argument is shown above.

Next, the

inference is said to arise from "obvious efforts to keep the
arrangement

secret."

There

is no

explanation

of what

the

supposedly obvious efforts at secrecy were. The facts are contrary
to this argument.

This argument

is contrary to plaintiffs'

previous assertion that Mr. Hurst was over at Steelco handpicking
what he wanted, and it is inconsistent with Heaton's deliveries in
broad daylight, before 5:00 p.m., while Steelco's second shift was
in progress, and Heaton's using of Steelco employees and cranes to
load the material (record reference at p. 14 of opening brief).
Where is there any evidence that Mr. Hurst, rather than Heaton, did
even one thing to conceal anything?
"inference"

arises

by

"Hurst's

It is argued that this

lying

unavailability of part of his records."

to

Elkington

about

There is no evidence

whatever of such a "lie," but on the contrary, Elkington was given
all the records he asked for.

He had asked for and obtained

Heaton's prior written consent to examine the 1986 and 1987 records
pertaining to the purchases of steel by Wasatch. He then asked for
1985 purchase records, and after obtaining Heaton's approval on the
telephone, those were provided.

He asked about earlier years and

was told that those records would be more difficult to locate.
Late in the day on New Year's Eve it was not convenient.
never told they did not exist or would not be produced.
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He was

Elkington

simply did not come back at a more convenient time to examine them.
There

was

no

accusation.

lying,
(See.

and
pp.

it

is

21-24

irresponsible

of

opening

to

brief

make
for

this

record

references.) Finally, the "inference" is supposed to arise from an
agreement to confirm a "phony" amount of purchases.

There is no

evidence whatever of any such agreement (no record reference is
given).

All that could be said is that Heaton told Elkington to

call to verify the amount.

(See fn. 2, p. 7, above.)

These inferences certainly do not meet plaintiffs1 "burden of
presenting clear and convincing evidence supporting his conspiracy
theory."

Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 793 (Utah

App. 1987).
Practically the entire case rests upon the wobbly base of
these so-called inferences. The only direct evidence available to
plaintiffs boils down to two points:

One is Heatonfs disputed

testimony about not telling Steelco about the purchases, and the
other is the acknowledged payment of commissions to Heaton involved
in the second discrete set of facts (the limited number of sales of
ballast steel to Steelco).

Heaton's revelations about his "not

telling" comments to Mr. Hurst were made only after his improper
conduct came to light and only in the course of trial.

Even

Heaton's and Williams' statements concerning commissions are made
only after termination of the supposed conspiracy.

They are not

statements of an alleged co-conspirator made in the course of the
alleged conspiracy.

As discussed in the opening brief (p. 51) ,

acts or declarations of an alleged co-conspirator which are offered
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to prove existence of a conspiracy are inherently suspect.

Only

declarations made during the course of the conspiracy can be used
to establish existence of conspiracy.

Statements made after

termination of the conspiracy or made only in the course of trial
are not accepted as evidence of the existence of the conspiracy.
The testimony should not be considered, therefore, on the question
of conspiracy. Wasatch has candidly admitted, however, the payment
of commissions to Heaton on the separate discrete transaction of
the sale of ballast steel, and it is appropriate to here further
consider this matter.
The commissions.
Plaintiffs again claim that defendants1 statement of facts is
"distorted and misrepresented." These harsh words sting. All that
can be said is that every effort was made to present an accurate
statement of facts, and only review of the record references will
tell.

The point remains, however, that commissions were paid to

Heaton, pursuant to Heatonfs request, for arranging purchases of
ballast steel.

Wasatchfs records clearly show four commissions

paid to Heaton totalling $2,363.44, which calculates to 25% on each
sale.

As shown in the opening brief, plaintiffs claim additional

commissions of $1,728.75 even though the records do not specify
what these payments were for.

The bottom line remains that an

admittedly unwise payment of $2,300 (or $4,000, to use plaintiffs1
calculation) in commissions does not make a $250,000 judgment.
Plaintiffs raise two points with respect to the payments to
Heaton (p. 63). The first disagreement is over the statement in
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the opening brief that three of the four commissions were only
shown in the check register and were not seen by Elkington in his
New Year's Eve visit because he had not asked to see the check
register.

Plaintiffs try to paint

description, but it is accurate.

some mala

fides

in this

Elkington asked to see the

records pertaining to sales of steel to Wasatch, and those records
were given to him and examined by him.

Elkington sought nothing

more in his hurried visit and made no further effort. Remember, he
is an experienced accountant.

If he wanted the check register, it

was a simple thing to ask for it. Having nothing further to argue
about, plaintiffs complain about the "roughness" of the material.
Hurst did not "peddle" anything.

Heaton, with authority of his

supervisor# sought to locate additional material to use as ballast.
(R. 451 at 22.)

Admittedly, the material he located through

Wasatch was rough, but so was "cobble" steel that had regularly
been used by Steelco.

(R. 451 at 121.)

on at least four occasions to Steelco.

This steel was delivered
Steelco knew the quality,

and it could have rejected delivery or payment at any time it
chose•
As

to Chris Williams,

even with

the

labored

effort

in

plaintiffs1 brief, the evidence is still not clear and convincing
that even one cent was ever paid to her.

All of plaintiffs1

efforts to shore up this obviously fabricated testimony (or, to be
charitable, testimony imagined by a long use of "mind altering"
drugs) does not bring this testimony to the requisite status of
clear

and

convincing

evidence.
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There

is not

one

shred

of

corroborative evidence.

In an effort to avoid the obvious impact

of this witness knowingly destroying two days before trial the only
document that could corroborate her testimony,

Steelco again

snidely refers to the "selective reappearance" of Wasatch1s cash
records.

This claim that Mr. Hurst

lied

in his deposition

concerning the theft of cash records is improperly asserted at
other places in the brief.

A great to-do arose at trial over the

introduction of an exhibit summarizing cash deposits from the bank
statements

and

cash

deposit

slips

contained

with

the

bank

statement.

In the deposition, plaintiffs' counsel asked, "What

records does Wasatch Steel have that show cash receipts and
disbursements during 1986"?

Mr. Hurst explained that "the entire

set of books were stolen" early in 1988.

This entire diatribe is

shown at R. 454 at 121 through 129 and clearly shows in his
deposition that the witness was referring to the journals of cash
transactions maintained by the bookkeeper, all of which were taken
when her briefcase was stolen from her car.

The exhibit prepared

by Mr. Hurst and presented at trial was taken from the bank
statements and bank deposit slips (Ex. 53-D).

Plaintiffs1 counsel

made great protestation of surprise and unfairness, but it is
submitted that had he really wanted bank statements in pretrial
discovery, or had that been what he was really intending to ask
about in the deposition, he could have asked specifically for that
or, better still, could have subpoenaed them from the bank.

That

is obviously not what he was seeking in the deposition; that was
not what Mr. Hurst was responding to.
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Mr. Hurst did not lie, and

counselfs inflammatory statements at trial and now again in this
brief are out of place.5 Plaintiffs even infer in their brief that
the explanation of the theft of the books and
fabricated or contrived.

journals was

If counsel had been so concerned, he

could have deposed or called as a witness the bookkeeper who had
the briefcase stolen from her car.

The point of all of this is

that this is but a side show inaccurately characterizing the record
and having no substantive relevance to this case.

It is offered

here primarily for prejudice, as it was at trial.
Steelco concedes that there are disparities in Williams1
calculation of these supposed commissions but dismisses these as
"minute and irrelevant mathematical disparities" due to Williams1
uncertainty

about

the

transaction

on

which

she

was

paid

a

commission, the precise amounts involved in any transaction, the
period of time during which she received the commission, or the
number of commissions.

(Plaintiffs1 brief at 18-19.)

It is Chris

Williams, however, who destroyed two days before trial her only
purported record of these alleged payments, and it remains that her
claim of commission payments is so farfetched that it is incredible
and certainly not clear and convincing.

5

This very conduct incited further hostility of the trial
court that was entirely misplaced and inappropriate (see, e.g., R.
454 at 121-122) and caused the court improperly to discredit all of
this witness's testimony (R. 454 at 127-128).
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C.

The Finding of Conversion
Is in Error

While the findings of fraud and conspiracy must be established
by clear and convincing evidence, plaintiffs' burden is less with
respect to its claim for conversion, but that burden has not been
met.
Steelco misconstrues Wasatch's position as an argument "that
a good faith purchaser should not be liable for conversion."
Wasatch does not dispute that, as a general rule, "a bona fide
purchaser of goods for value from one who has no right to sell them
becomes a converter when he takes possession of such goods."
Allred v. Hinklev, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958) (emphasis
added).
The general rule has limited application to this case for two
reasons:

First, Heaton had actual or apparent authority to sell

the steel; second, Heaton obtained title to some of the steel by
purchase or gift.
The superintendent
had authority.
We pause here to respond to plaintiffs' reply to defendants'
explanation of their just reliance on Heaton's authority to dispose
of material be they cuttings or South Yard stuff.

(Pp. 52-55 of

opening brief.) The matter of Heaton's authority has relevance to
both the fraud and conversion claims.

We have here a situation

where an outside party reasonably believed that it was dealing with
one permitted to make the transactions involved.

Plaintiffs'

argument as to the significance of Heaton's authority is again
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circuitous—since the court found that Heaton was selling stolen
stuff, defendants could not have relied on his authority.
argument falls of its own weight.

This

Plaintiffs argue that Wasatch

could not rely on authority of a man to whom they were "regularly
paying bribes."

Plaintiffs here again exaggerate and claim too

much for the point.

They are entitled to argue that the payments

were "bribes/1 but the harshness of the language does not help
their cause.

It was Heaton who requested a "commission" for

arranging these sales (R. 451 at 22) , and plaintiffs have candidly
admitted the payments.

The hyperbolic assertion of "regular"

payments conceals the fact that the commissions were paid on only
four occasions in late 1986 and 1987.

They had no relevance

whatever to the sales of cuttings from 1983 on or the sales of the
South Yard material in 1986.
Steelco tries to get around the consequence of the authority
generally held by and specifically given to its superintendent by
arguing that Steelco, as the principal, really did not do anything
to lead third parties to rely upon their superintendent. But, like
other of these arguments, it is without foundation.

The argument

is simply that if the court so found, it must be so, without regard
to the absence of adequate evidence.

It is undisputed that, as to

the South Yard material, Heatonfs boss, Mr. Hansen, did give
specific authority to dispose of the material.

(R. 451 at 13-17.)

The opening brief (pp. 52-55) correctly explains the authority of
the superintendent to dispose of not only the South Yard material
but the cuttings as well. Further, there is nothing in the record
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to counter Mr. Hurst's explanation of the customary disposition of
scrap cuttings in the industry.

(R. 454 at 162-168.)

As to the authority of Heaton in regard to the conversion
claim, the "actual or apparent authority" of Heaton suggests far
more than good faith on the part of Wasatch.

Because an agent of

Steelco's, acting within the scope of his actual or apparent
authority, sold the steel to Wasatch, Steelco did not have title to
the steel and cannot prevail on a conversion claim.
Heaton had express authority to sell some of the steel in
Steelco's yard, to buy some for his own use, and to sell some to
other employees.

(R. 450 at 126-128, 132-135, 162-164, 191-192,

196-197; R. 452 at 194.)

He had, in fact, made sales to others

both before and after this, and sales were regularly made from the
shop.

(R. 450 at 196; 451 at 85, 86.)

Heaton was the individual

"directly in charge" of the scrap pile; he had the specific duty to
use or dispose of leftover steel.

(R. 450 at 121-122, 164.)

"Whenever the performance of certain business is confided to an
agent, such authority carries with it, by implication, authority to
do collateral acts which are the natural and ordinary incidents of
the main act or business authorized."
862, 864 (Utah 1978).

Bowen v. Olsen. 576 P.2d

Heaton made sales to at least three other

companies of steel which Steelco claims to have been stolen.
451 at 32-37; R. 452 at 147, 207; R. 453 at 4-5.)

(R.

It is

significant that plaintiffs produced no evidence that any of these
companies

questioned

his

authority
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to

sell

it.

For

all

appearances, these sales were the natural and ordinary incidents of
Heaton's duties as superintendent.
Heaton was not just a "thief";
he obtained title to some of
the steel he sold to Wasatch.
The second exception to the general rule that a bona fide
purchaser can nevertheless be liable for conversion relates to the
fundamental principle that a plaintiff must have title to the goods
for a "conversion" to occur.

See, Benton v. Div. of State Lands &

Forestry, 709 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah 1985).

A conversion action

cannot be maintained if the plaintiff is not entitled to immediate
possession of the property.

Larsen v. Knight, 233 P.2d 365, 374

(Utah 1951).
This exception occurs "where there is a bona fide purchase of
goods which the true owner was originally induced to sell by
fraud."

W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 85 (4th Ed.

1971) .

In such case, title has passed on the sale, and the

original owner can only rescind the transaction to recover the
goods.

Then a bona fide purchaser who had no notice of the fraud

is not liable to the original owner for conversion.

A bona fide

purchaser cuts off the original owner's equitable rights to the
property.
Under the Uniform Commercial

Code, a purchaser of goods

acquires all the title which his transferor had, except that a good
faith purchaser for value has power to transfer good title even
though "the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as
larcenous under the criminal law."
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-

403(1)(d) (1990 Replacement). A thief cannot pass good title, but
a person who obtains property bv fraud can transfer good title to
a bona fide purchaser. Merrill v. Dietz fin re Universal Clearing
House Co.). 62 B.R. 118, 124 (D. Utah 1986).
Heaton obtained the steel he sold to Wasatch in four different
ways: (1) some of it was given to him by Steelco6; (2) some of it
he paid for7; (3) some of it he took without Steelco1s knowledge;
and (4) some of it he was authorized to sell for Steelco.8
had good title to the steel he obtained by gift.
defeasible title to the steel he paid for.

Heaton

He also had

Steelco argues that

Heaton paid less for some loads than they were worth, but it has
not kept accurate records of its sales to him.

In estimating

damages, the trial court allowed a credit for some of the existing
receipts from Heaton's purchases. But if, as Steelco alleged, the
steel had a value above what Heaton paid for it, Wasatch should
have received a credit for that full value.

Even if he paid too

little, Heaton obtained title to the steel, and Wasatch cannot be
held for converting those loads for which Heaton paid something.
The evidence showed that Heaton purchased steel with authorization of Mr. Milzarek and Mr. Hansen.

Heaton made cash payments

to Mr. Milzarek or Patty Midgley for which Steelco kept no record.
At times Heaton was not even given a receipt for his money.
6

(For

R. 450 at 13, 165.

7

R. 451 at 72-73, 78-79, 86, 90, 94; Ex. 16-P; R. 450 at 178184; R: 450 at 197; R. 451 at 96-100, 178-184.
8

R. 452 at 194; 451 at 16-18.
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record references, see pp. 10-11 of opening brief.)

Steelco1s

failure to keep accurate records of its sales to Heaton should not
create a presumption of nonpayment for which Wasatch is held
liable.
Steelcofs argument that "Heaton created phony paperwork which
was aimed at leading other Steelco employees to believe that he was
purchasing the steel11 is at best but an argument that Heaton
defrauded his employer.

It does not make Wasatch a converter of

material that Steelco1s superintendent obtained by fraud.
Ill
The Error In the Damage Award
Plaintiffs make only two responses to the explanation in the
opening brief that the court applied an erroneous measure of
damages and miscalculated the amount even under that measure.
These responses are continued reliance on retail value as the
measure and a pejorative attack on defendants1 explanation of the
errors in calculation.
The value of goods to
a wholesaler is not
retail market value.
As to the measure of damages, Steelco relies primarily on
Allred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 726 (Utah 1958), and Simmons. Inc. v.
Pinkerton's Inc.. 762 P.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985) , for the proposition
that damages should be based on sales price rather than the cost of
replacement.

Simmons was not a conversion action and required

application of Indiana law.
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In Allred, the court held that a defendant who converted seed
to its own use was entitled to the full value of such seed less the
amount which the grower received from it as advancements. 328 P.2d
at 728. The court did not attempt to define the term "full value."
Apparently, the term refers to full "fair market value." However,
the meaning of fair market value varies with the context in which
the standard is applied.
"The fundamental principle of damages is to restore the
injured party to the position he would have been in had it not been
for the wrong of the other party."

Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 241

P.2d 914, 920 (Utah 1952). Steelco admits that it sold any remnant
"for the same price it would have charged for new steel."
reference at p. 8 of opening brief.)

(Record

In fact, since the entire

piece of new steel had already been sold to a customer before it
was cut, Steelco received double pay for any of these cuttings that
it sold again.

Even so, Steelco usually considered these small

sales not worth the effort and "discouraged" them.

(R. 451 at 119-

120.) Steelco "didn't desire that kind of business because it took
time and effort and usually the sales were small."
120.)

(R. 451 at 119-

Because Steelco did not wish to handle small customers, it

often directed customers to Wasatch.

(R. 450 at 151.)

Further,

plaintiffs presented no evidence whatever to show which part of the
supposed converted steel was remnant and which was scrap.
Clearly, in these circumstances, Steelco1s "injury" for the
steel Heaton took should not be valued at the retail market value
of new steel.

This is especially so when it is remembered that
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Steelco replaces these cuttings daily from the "tons and tons"
produced from its processing in its own plant and that the stock
from which the processing is done is purchased by it directly from
the manufacturer.
Notwithstanding plaintiffs' acerbic attack on defendants1
integrity in citation of the record (p. 74), it is submitted that
the shoe is on the other foot.
included where appropriate.

Record references have been

(See pp. 64-66 and throughout the

statement of facts in opening brief.)

It is plaintiffs who have

failed to cite the record and continue with their hyperbolic
argument.

For example, it is not uncontested (as plaintiffs argue

at p. 74) that Heaton sold only remnant material from Steelco.
There are two pages of citations in the opening brief (pp. 65 and
65) showing that this is contested.

There is no record citation

for Steelco1s assertion that "Wasatch Steel purchased only remnant#
not scrap, from Heaton."

(Plaintiffs1 brief at 74.)

There is

likewise no support for the assertion that "The remnant steel that
was stolen was in the main taken from remnant racks, where it was
placed to be reused, as new steel, in Steelcofs
operation.

fabrication

The remnant material was worth as much to Steelco as

new steel—the pieces were just smaller."

See discussion at pages

63-65 of opening brief.
The position stated in the opening brief is correct.

The

trial court's application of damage concepts and calculation of
damages is clearly erroneous.
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There was no basis for an
award of attorney fees.
Steelco apparently concedes that the only legal basis for the
trial courtfs award of attorney fees would be to consider those
fees as part of the punitive damage award.

(Plaintiffs1 brief at

75.) The only precedent cited for a "punitive" attorney fee award
is DeBry & Hilton Travel Services. Inc. v. Capitol Internat'l
Airways. Inc., 583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978).
denied in DeBry.

Attorney fees were

This Court affirmed this denial, explaining:

This court has consistently adhered to the general rule
that attorneyfs fees are not recoverable as damages in
either actions on contract or in torts, if there is no
statutory or contractual authority for such fees.
At 1185. The Court then noted in dictum that counsel fees could be
considered as an element of damages only in those cases in which
exemplary damages are or can be awarded.

The basic damage in this

case is clearly erroneous and excessive, and the punitive damages
are in an amount that will do more than punish—they will destroy.
It is not appropriate that attorney fees be added.
The punitive damage award
was improper and excessive.
If the attorney fees awarded in this case could be considered
a further award of punitive damages, the excessive amount of those
damages is even more obvious.
Actual damages were awarded

in the principal amounts of

$104,438.00 and $15,979.15 plus interest; punitive damages were
awarded in the amount of $100,000.00 plus interest.

(R. 379-380.)

Attorney fees, which Steelco justifies as part of the punitive
damages award, were awarded in the amount of $35,850.00.
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(R. 380.)

Thus, the ratio of actual to punitive damages, considering only the
amounts of principal, was $120,417.15 to $135,850.00.
Punitive damages are the exception rather than the rule and
should be imposed cautiously.

"Punitive damages should be awarded

infrequently" and "they are not intended to vent vindictiveness."
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc.. 675 P.2d 1179, 1186-1187
(Utah 1983) . They are "not intended as additional compensation to
a plaintiff, [and] must, if awarded, serve a societal interest of
punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious conduct which is
not likely to be deterred by other means." Atkin Wright & Miles v.
Mountain States Tel.. 709 P.2d 330, 337 (Utah 1985).
This award was not imposed cautiously.

It is an astronomical

award that could well be the death knell for Wasatch, a much
smaller business than the plaintiff Steelco.

As shown by its

financial statement, Wasatch simply cannot afford to pay such sums
and remain in business.
A vindictive desire to destroy Wasatch Steel is manifested by
plaintiffs1 brief and particularly its discussion on damages. This
attitude has been manifest throughout this dispute.
For example, Elkington insisted on crediting Heaton1s payments
under the settlement agreement first to the transactions with All
Star, one of the other companies that purchased steel cuttings from
Heaton.

(R. 453 at 9.)

Steelco has never asserted a claim against

All Star and has no intention to do so.

(R. 454 at 10.)

It is

believed that Steelco has likewise brought no action against any of
the other companies that purchased steel from Heaton.
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Heaton and

Williams—whose potential criminal liability is clear and whose
testimony is obviously self-serving—were not prosecuted.
Not only did Steelco receive money from Heaton in settlement
of its claims, but it might have recovered from its fidelity
insurance.

(R. 454 at 5.)

However, Elkington chose to file "only

a claim on the cash thefts by Chris Williams."

(Id.)

He did not

even file a claim as to Volma Heaton's thefts or the alleged
"kickbacks."

(Id. at 6.)

He explained:

Those were claims that were going to take a lot of work
to assemble and to prove. And I thought that that could
best be handled either through negotiations directly with
Wasatch Steel or a filing of a civil suit.
(Id.)
Steelco1s motivation for singling out Wasatch is shown by
Elkington's testimony at trial:
Q.

So by putting it over here and the filing of
this lawsuit and pursuing it the way you have,
you intend to punish Lynn Hurst, is that
correct, because you think he lied to you?

A.

[Elkington] I guess I wouldn't characterize it
as punishment.
I believe I am entitled to
allocate the proceeds any way I wish.

Q.

I am asking you another question now. It goes
beyond allocation. You want to punish Lynn
Hurst in this lawsuit; is that correct?

A.

Sure.

Q.

And you want to punish Wasatch Steel, is that
also correct?

A.

I want to recognize—I want them to be
recognized for the type of dealings they
conducted with the employees in my company.

(R. 453 at 10-11.)

43

This case should not be utilized as a vehicle to satisfy the
vindictive desire of plaintiffs' president.

REPLY TO CROSS-APPEAL
I
Defendants Did Not Violate
The Racketeering Act
The trial court correctly dismissed the claim under Utah's
racketeering act, now known as the "Pattern of Unlawful Activity
Act."9

(See R. 364, 5 15.)

The findings on this claim were first

made in the court's Memorandum Decision:
The acts of the parties herein do not bring them within
the [state] racketeering act. The necessary requirements
are not met. The Court finds that for the racketeering
act to apply, there must be three similar episodes that
involve separate and different entities, and not within
the same entity. The purpose of the racketeering act is
to prohibit racketeering. That is, to prohibit illegal
businesses being set up to defraud other businesses or
people as a racket. The fact that there were similar
episodes involving Heaton and Wasatch Steel do not
satisfy the requirements.
(R. 279,fl25; emphasis added.) The court instructed plaintiffs to
prepare additional findings of fact and conclusions of law "that
are supportive of this Memorandum Decision."
The

findings prepared

by

plaintiffs

(R. 280, J 27.)
contain

this

terse

paragraph regarding the racketeering claim:
Plaintiffs did not prove the existence of three similar
episodes of unlawful activity that involve separate and
different entities, as required by the Racketeering Act.
9

Prior to its amendment in 1987, Utah's racketeering statute
was known as the "Racketeer Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act"
(RICE). See, State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 101 (Utah 1988). The
statute was also amended in 1985, 1988, and 1990.
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Plaintiffs demonstrated only that Wasatch Steel Inc. and
Hurst engaged in episodes of unlawful activity involving
Steelco, but not any other persons or entities.
(R. 359, Finding 62.)
Plaintiffs now argue that "the trial court held that the Act
requires proof of episodes of unlawful activity involving three
separate victims."

(Plaintiffs' brief at 80.)

In making this

argument, plaintiffs mischaracterize the holding. Nowhere did the
court say three separate victims was a requirement.

Rather, the

Memorandum Decision states more broadly that plaintiffs failed to
show the necessary elements for such a claim.
The elements of a "pattern of unlawful activity" and an
"enterprise" are common to each of the four subsections of § 76-101603 which plaintiffs allege were violated.
contained in Appendix B to this brief.

Section 76-10-1603 is

See. State v. McGrath. 749

P.2d 631, 637 (Utah 1988) ("pattern of racketeering [unlawful]
activity" and "enterprise" are necessary elements for conviction
under RICE statute). Plaintiffs failed to make an adequate showing
as to either of these elements.
Plaintiffs failed to
show a predicate offense.
The Act defines "unlawful activity" as "conduct which would
constitute

any offense described

by the following

crimes or

categories of crimes. . . . regardless of whether the act is in
fact charged or indicted."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(4).

The

statute then enumerates the possible predicate offenses.
In

their

complaint,

plaintiffs

alleged

three

predicate

offenses: theft, receiving stolen property, and bribery. However,
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they failed to show any of these offenses.10

A conversion can be

committed in good faith and is not the equivalent of a theft. The
court dismissed the claim for receiving stolen property.

Nor was

bribery shown.11
Since plaintiffs failed to show that one of the enumerated
acts of "unlawful activity" had been committed, a fortiori, they
failed to show a "pattern of unlawful activity."
Plaintiffs failed to show a
"pattern of unlawful activity".
A "pattern of unlawful activity" is defined as:
[E]ngaging in conduct which constitutes the commission of
at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which
episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission,
or
otherwise
are
interrelated
by
distinguishing characteristics.
Taken together, the
episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct
and be related either to each other or to the enterprise.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602 (1991 Supp.).
Although this definition differs from the definition of a
"pattern of racketeering activity" under the federal statute,
ia

"Conspiracy" was an enumerated act under a former
racketeering statute, but it was never "a separate basis for
recovery." See. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields v. Tracy Collins Bank.
558 F.Supp. 1042, 1048 (Utah 1983). It is no longer listed as a
predicate offense in recent amendments of the act.
11

The Act specifically defines the "unlawful activity" that
may serve as a predicate offense.
(Section 76-10-1602(4)).
Specific types of bribery are enumerated in the statute, such as
"bribery of a labor official" and "bribery by a public servant."
None of these apply.
Plaintiffs refer simply to "bribery" in
general by reference to Section 76-6-508, but the Act lists as an
"unlawful activity" only "bribery or receiving bribe by person in
the business of selection, appraisal, or criticism of goods."
Section 76-10-1602(4)(s) (1990 & Supp. 1991).
Even if the
commissions paid to Heaton could be considered bribes, Heaton was
not in the business of selecting, appraising or criticizing goods.
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federal cases which elaborate on that definition are helpful in our
analysis.
A "pattern of racketeering activity" contemplates "multiple
transactions or episodes, not just multiple acts to promote the
same transaction or episode." Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F.Supp. 570
578 (D. Utah 1986). It requires "planned, ongoing continuing crime
and the threat of continuing criminal conduct, as opposed to
sporadic, isolated criminal episodes or events."

Cook v. Zions

First Nat'l Bank, 645 F.Supp. 423, 425-26 (D. Utah 1986). Where "a
single fraudulent scheme is relied upon, albeit multiple acts
allegedly were committed by defendant," the plaintiff has failed to
present the requisite pattern.

Cady v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,

648 F.Supp. 621, 626 (D. Utah 1986).
At most, plaintiffs1 claims assert multiple acts to promote
the same transaction or episode.

There was only one actual or

potential victim and no evidence of a broader set of criminal
objectives.

In short, there was no pattern of racketeering

activity.
Plaintiffs failed
to show a distinct
racketeering "enterprise".
11

[P] roof

of

the

existence

of

an

relationship to the racketeering activity

enterprise

its

is essential for a

conviction" under Utah's racketeering statute.
P.2d 100, 103 n.2 (Utah 1988).

and

State v. Bell. 770

An enterprise may consist of "an

individual, corporation, or other business entity, or any de facto
association, and may be either a legal or an illicit entity."
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Id.

However, the federal and state statutes are similar in requiring
that the "enterprise" be an "entity separate and apart from the
pattern of activity in which it engages." McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 at
637.
In McGrath, the court found that the defendant and another man
had an "ongoing association in fact" for the purpose of making
money from the sale of controlled substances.

Id.

"The two men

functioned as a 'continuing unit for a common purpose of engaging
in a course of conduct.•

Id.

By contrast, defendants and Heaton

never functioned as a "continuing unit."

When Heaton obtained

steel from his employer, it was he alone who determined whether to
pay his employer for it and how to dispose of it.

At times he

resold it to Wasatch; at other times he resold it to All Star, Mr.
Trailer, or others—without any involvement on the part of these
defendants.
The "enterprise" must also be distinct from the "persons" who
are defendants in the action.

E.g., Grant v. Union Bank. 629

F.Supp. 570, 574-75 (D. Utah 1986); Bennett v. United States Trust
Co. of New York, 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985), cert, denied,
106 S.Ct. 800 (1986) and cases cited therein.
Thus,

the

trial

court

correctly

found

that

"for

the

racketeering act to apply, there must be three similar episodes
that involve separate and different entities, and not within the
same entity."

(R. 279, 5 25.)
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II
The Pawn Broker Act
Is Not Applicable
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs1 claim that defendants
received stolen property in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408.
The court correctly held that this section did not apply because
"the parties involved are not pawnbrokers or persons dealing in or
collecting used or secondhand merchandise. . . .

While Wasatch

Steel may sell steel that has been used, the above section does not
contemplate such businesses or activities as involved in this
case." (Memorandum Decision, R. 280, 5 26; see R. 359, Finding 63.)
A civil action is permitted by Section 76-6-412(2) only
against persons mentioned in Section 76-6-408(2)(d).

Section

408(2)(d) imposes special requirements on pawnbrokers or persons
who are similarly situated. For example, a pawnbroker must require
the seller or person delivering the property to certify, in
writing, that he has the legal right to sell the property.
Subsection (2) (d) .

The mere fact that Wasatch sells some used

steel, as well as new, should not subject it to these special
requirements.

To hold otherwise would create potential liability

for many of the businesses in this state just because some of the
items they sell may have been used before.
No case has been found in which this statute was extended to
a party who was not, in effect, a pawnbroker.
The civil action permitted by Section 412(2) requires a
finding that the defendant knew that the goods were stolen.
Finding 13 is clearly erroneous is shown above.
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That

The presumptions

that plaintiffs rely upon cannot be applied, because the findings
which are the necessary predicate for those presumptions to apply
are for the same reason clearly erroneous, and, moreover, the
findings were

not made

in sufficient

detail

to

sustain

the

presumption required by this Act.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The trial court misconstrued and misapplied important legal
principles. The statute of limitations barred substantially all of
plaintiffs1 claims; prior release of Heaton precluded assertion of
any claims.

The factual findings are clearly erroneous.

The

damages are based on an improper measure of damages and are
incorrectly calculated even under that measure. Attorney fees are
not authorized.

The absence of clear and convincing evidence of

fraud precludes the award of punitive damages, and those damages,
in any event# are excessive.
Neither statute upon which plaintiffs assert liability in
their cross-appeal is applicable here, and dismissal of those
claims should be affirmed.
The judgment

should be reversed

and the case should be

dismissed.
Respectfully submitted.
GARDINER^H#TZE

^ L . L W d l n e r , Jr.

*~

Attorneys for Defendants/
Appellants
DATED:

November 27, 1991
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Plaintiffs/Appellees hereto by mailing four true and correct copies
thereof, postage prepaid, this 27th day of November, 1991, to the
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Bruce A. Maak, Esq.
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P. O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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APPENDIX A
Testimony of Volma Heaton that He Told Defendants
He Was Buying and Reselling the Steel and that
The Subject Never Came Up Again
(R. 451 at 78-81)
Q.
A.

You told them where you worked?
Yes.
* * *

A*
Q.

Yes, Lynn knew where I worked.
All right. Did you tell him that this was
Steelco's material?

A.

When I first started dealing with him, I told
him that I was buying it and reselling it.

Q.

And that is the only conversation you had along
that line, is it?
That is right.

A.

* * *

[Q.]
A.

And that is the only conversation you ever had
along that line, isn't it?
That is right.
* * *

A.

In fact, it was never brought up after that with
the exception of I would say a few months after I
started dealing with Lynn, one of his employees was
there when I brought it in. He was an employee.
Whether or jokingly or serious, he said, fI don't
know. It looks like high rate stuff to me. • And
Lynn said, 'No, it is not.• And I said, 'No, it is
not. •
* * *

Q.
A.

When you mentioned the word fhigh grade,• does that
have a meaning in the steel industry?
Yes. Well, not in the steel industry, anywhere.
It is hot or stolen.

Q.
A.

High grade means it is stolen?
Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q.

And you denied that; is that correct?
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I didnft answer.
bought it.f

Lynn said, 'No, it is not.

He

And that is what you told him initially?
That is correct.
Was that you were buying it?
That is correct.
And the subject never came up again?
No, it did not.
All right.
Well, let me — Let m e — Let me retrack [sic]
[retract] that to this extent. That on occasion
there was, when we finished cleaning out the yard,
there were some beams and stuff that were sold and
I told Mr. Hurst that the material was delivered
over there. I told him part of it was theirs, part
of it was Steelco's, part of it was mine.
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APPENDIX B
Section 76-10-1603
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any
proceeds derived, whether directly or indirectly, from a
pattern of unlawful activity in which the person has
participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly
or indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds
of the income, or the proceeds derived from the
investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of
unlawful activity to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate,
whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful
activity.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate
any provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (3).
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